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Recent discussions of tax reform have emphasized the importance of 
defining the tax base as economic income and of taxing that base at 
lower rates. Specific proposals have differed with respect to the par- 
ticular means of implementing these goals. Our paper (see Martin Feld- 
stein, ed., The Effects of  Taxation on Capital Accumulation [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 19871) examines the Treasury tax plan of 
November 1984 and the president’s proposal of May 1985 as they would 
amend taxation of  income from capital. We  find that these reforms 
would differ in their relative emphases on alleviating interasset, inter- 
sectoral, interindustry, and intertemporal distortions. 
Our approach in this paper is to measure the net effects of proposed 
changes in statutory rates, credits, depreciation allowances, and other 
features of the tax code such as the indexation of interest and capital 
gains. We  compare costs of capital for individual assets, sectors, and 
industries and weight these together to evaluate the impact on total 
investment incentives under the administration’s plans. Then, using a 
general equilibrium model, we simulate alternative resource allocations 
and associated changes in welfare. 
The results  of  our  study  depend  in  part  on the assumed role  of 
dividend taxes. We  initially consider the “new view”  that dividend 
taxes have only a small effect on investment incentives. Under this 
assumption, current law and the president’s plan provide the highest 
incentives for investment as a whole. The costs of capital (and, equiv- 
alently, the effective tax rates on income from capital) are similar under 
these two regimes. The Treasury plan would raise the cost of capital 
Don Fullerton is  associate  professor of  economics  at  the  University  of  Virginia. 
Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
101 102  Don Fullerton and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson 
almost 7% from its current level and would therefore tend to deter 
capital formation. On the other hand, both administration plans would 
tend to allocate capital more efficiently across its uses. The Treasury 
plan is most effective in narrowing the disparities in the cost of capital 
across assets (within each sector). For example, within the corporate 
sector, we find that the effective rates for investments in different types 
of equipment, structures, inventories, and land would all lie between 
39% and 52%, compared with a range of -  4% to +  50% under current 
law. The rates across assets would become  more similar because of 
the abolition of the investment tax credit (which is currently available 
only for equipment) and because of adoption of depreciation allowances 
closely adhering to economic depreciation. Remaining differences are 
primarily the result of differential local property taxes. The president’s 
plan would tax corporate assets at rates ranging from 24% to 45%. This 
range is larger than under the Treasury plan because of the adoption 
of accelerated depreciation provisions that confer preferential taxation 
on depreciable assets relative to inventories and land. 
We  find, however, that the president’s plan would be more effective 
in  narrowing the disparities in  capital  costs and effective  tax  rates 
across industries and sectors than would the Treasury plan. This stems 
largely from the treatment of corporate investments relative to owner- 
occupied housing. As a result of elimination of deductibility of local 
property taxes, both plans would raise somewhat the effective tax rate 
on owner-occupied  housing. The president’s plan would not change 
the overall tax rate in the corporate sector, so the preexisting disparity 
between corporations and housing is diminished. The Treasury plan 
would produce a sizable increase in the cost of corporate investments. 
This increase would lead to a greater difference in the relative treatment 
of  heavily corporate industries such as manufacturing and other in- 
dustries such as agriculture and housing, where the corporate form of 
organization is not predominant. 
These findings are somewhat changed under the “old view” of div- 
idend taxes. Under this view, dividend taxes are a significant compo- 
nent of capital costs. Corporations would be provided a deduction for 
50% of dividends under the Treasury plan and 10% under the presi- 
dent’s plan. These features have a more substantial impact on reducing 
the corporate costs of capital when the old view is considered. Under 
this theory, we conclude that both plans cause a slight reduction in the 
overall cost of capital and both would lower intersectoral distortions. 
We  then turn to a simulation of these reforms over a fifty-year horizon 
using a general equilibrium model. This model is able to evaluate ef- 
ficiency gains or losses from the various features of revised taxes on 
capital incomes. The effect of interasset tax distortions is captured by 
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ventories, and land in production in response to their relative capital 
costs. Intersectoral distortions are captured because of  the model’s 
endogenous allocation of  capital among corporations, noncorporate 
business, and owner-occupied housing. Finally, the effect of taxes on 
intertemporal allocation of  resources is captured in that households 
decide how much to save in response to the after-tax rate of  return. 
This saving determines the accumulation of  capital over time. 
Under the “new view” of dividend taxes, in most of our simulations, 
we find that both reforms generate net welfare gains even with slight 
declines in the capital stock. That is, in terms of output, a more efficient 
allocation of  capital more than makes up for a lower capital stock. 
Under the “old view” that dividend taxes have a significant effect on 
investment, both plans reduce intertemporal distortions as well as dif- 
ferences among assets. Under this view, the Treasury plan no longer 
worsens intertemporal distortions. Even for the least favorable set of 
parameters in this case, these reforms raise both the capital stock (by 
0.5%0.7%)  and the real value of  output (by 0.3%0.4%). 
Finally,  our paper  shows alternative allocations of  capital across 
assets, sectors, and industries. We  expect firms to make relatively less 
use of equipment as a result of the reforms, but the industrial mix of 
output will depend on the particular assumptions about dividend taxes. 
Under the Treasury proposal with the new view of dividend taxes, the 
only industries that would experience a long-run increase in output 
would be agriculture and housing. Under the president’s plan with the 
new view, more industries would experience increases in  output, but 
housing would decline. Simulation under the old view produces the 
largest increases in output for the heavily corporate manufacturing and 
mining industries and declines for real estate. 
To  summarize, our paper contains a comprehensive model of  in- 
vestment incentives and estimates of  the efficiency effects of tax re- 
form. It is important to realize, however, that it does not provide 
information about the effects of  tax reform on equity, simplicity, or 
other criteria essential to final policy judgments. This Page Intentionally Left Blank